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Abstract
This paper reexamines the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous
workers in a search-matching model with bargained wages and free entry. As-
suming that firms hire their best applicants, we state that participation is
insufficient whatever workers’ bargaining strengths. The reason for this is that,
when holding a job, the marginal participant should receive the entire output.
As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation,
job creation, and employment. Therefore the aggregate income of the economy
is enhanced.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the efficiency of participation in a search-matching model with
heterogeneous workers and recruitment selection. We also describe the effects of the
minimum wage in this environment.
Labor theory generally accounts for participation choices by assuming that individuals
give different values to inactivity. The usual search and matching model follows the
same line (Pissarides 2000). Individuals are homogenous when holding a job (they
have the same productivity) whereas they are heterogeneous when inactive. According
to this traditional view of participation, inactive individuals are ”lazy”. Recently
Albrecht et al. (2010) have introduced another approach to participation. Workers
are assumed to be vertically differentiated. Since there are search frictions in the
labor market only highly-skilled workers choose to join it. By contrast, low-skilled
workers choose inactivity; the wages they expect from holding a job are not high
enough to compensate for the risk of unemployment. According to this alternative
view, individuals are inactive because they are insufficiently skilled.
Building on Albrecht et al., Gavrel (2011) finds that too many individuals participate
in the labor market according to the social surplus criterion. The intuition behind
this finding is that when deciding to join the market, lower-skilled workers are not
aware of the (negative) impact of their choices on the average output of matches in
the market.
This result is obtained under what we consider to be a very strong assumption.
Recruitment is random; hence all workers face the same probability of finding a job,
independently of their productivity. We instead presume that firms are selective.
They prefer good workers to bad ones. They then rank their applicants and hire
the best. Under this assumption highly-skilled job-seekers have a greater chance of
success than low-skilled ones. Hence the model that we develop does not contradict
the observed facts. But this is not our main point. What is really of importance is
the influence this has on conclusions regarding the efficiency of participation. In this
respect our findings are very different. We state that when firms are selective, too
few individuals participate in the labor market. The reason for this is that, contrary
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to Gavrel (2011), with recruitment selection the probability of a firm hiring a high-
skilled worker is no longer affected by the entry of lower-skilled ones. Consequently,
any individual whose expected output compensates for her inactivity income should
enter the labor market. As part of the output goes to firms, the private return to
participation is unavoidably lower than the social one.
With respect to the efficiency of job creation, we state that firms tend to create too
many vacancies. Similar to Gavrel (2012), firms do not internalize the fact that an
increase in labor demand lowers the expected productivity of their best applicants.
What could be done to improve the efficiency of the labor market? From a theo-
retical point a view a range of measures can be considered. We here show that the
introduction of a mandatory minimum wage is an effective instrument in rendering
the labor market more attractive. Intuitively, a minimum wage (provided it is not set
at too high a level) increases labor supply and the unemployment rate. More surpris-
ingly, labor demand increases. We explain how recruitment selection generates this
unexpected result. Therefore, despite the unemployment rate increase, the aggregate
income necessarily rises. Subsidies to participants also enhance the aggregate income.
Following Hosios and Pissarides, most papers dealing with the efficiency of the labor
market retain the criterion of the social surplus (also referred to as the aggregate
income). In retaining this criterion one implicitly assumes that incomes can be redis-
tributed at no cost. Otherwise, an increase in the aggregate income is not necessarily
Pareto-improving. As a consequence, different authors prefer to focus on the value
of being unemployed. In our setting with heterogeneous workers, introducing a mini-
mum wage appears to raise the expected income of all participants. This also results
from recruitment selection.
In the relevant literature we can distinguish between two subsets. First, some pa-
pers build on Pissarides (2000, Chap.8). See for instance Lehmann et al. (2011) for
a study of optimal income taxation with endogenous participation. In Pissarides’
model, job creation and individuals’ participation decisions are efficient if and only
if the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment (usually de-
noted by η) coincides with workers’ bargaining strengths (usually denoted by β): the
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famous Hosios condition1. Conversely, if the bargaining power of workers is not high
enough (if β is lower than η), participation will be insufficient. In this case the mini-
mum wage could improve aggregate income by acting as a substitute for an increase
in workers’ bargaining strengths. Although this empirical point is controversial, it
seems that the bargaining power of workers is too high. For instance, Flinn (2011)
finds β = 0.4 and η < 0.4. By contrast, assuming vertically differentiated workers
and recruitment selection we show that, according to the social surplus criterion,
minimum wage efficiency no longer depends on workers’ bargaining strengths. The
other subset includes papers which attempt to derive the matching function from first
principles. As Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) put it, this literature seeks to throw
some light into the black box. Many of these articles are, like the present one, based
on the urn-ball model. Some authors assume recruitment selection. In a well-known
paper Blanchard and Diamond (1994) account for the persistence of unemployment
by assuming that firms rank their applicants according to their unemployment spells.
Along the same line of research, Moscarini (1997) shows that ranking of job appli-
cants by ability gives rise to spurious duration dependence of unemployment when
workers’ heterogeneity is unobserved.2 Moen (1999) states that recruitment selection
is likely to create an over-education effect, while Gavrel (2009) argues that, where
applicants are ranked, the technical skill bias can be seen as a consequence of a rise
in unemployment. As mentioned above, using the circular matching model, Gavrel
(2012) shows that selection makes job creation excessive.
To summarize, our contribution is twofold. First, relative to Gavrel (2011)3, which is
close to Albrecht et al. (2010)4, we show that participation is unavoidably insufficient
when firms rank their applicants. Second, relative to the usual search-matching model
1In the absence of recruitment selection this condition is quite robust. See for instance Zenou
(2009) in a spatial context.
2Mocarini proposes a more general matching function with recruitment selection. For expositional
simplicity, we restrict the analysis to urn-ball matching with applicant ranking. However, our results
extend to Moscarini’s specification.
3Relative to Gavrel (2012), who assumes recruitment selection, we extend the analysis to vertically
differentiated workers and endogenous participation.
4Contrary to Gavrel (2011), Albrecht et al. (2010) study the efficiency of job creation when
participation is set by individuals’ decisions.
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with endogenous participation (Flinn 2006, 2011), we state that the effects of the
introduction of a minimum wage are quite different with heterogeneous workers and
recruitment selection.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our setting. Next we define
a laissez-faire equilibrium and study its welfare properties (section 3). The results
concerning the introduction of a minimum wage are stated in section 4 while section
5 provides an analysis of the impact of subsidies to participants. Section 6 concludes.
In Appendix F, we check that results extend to a dynamic setting. Appendix G con-
siders posted wages a` la Moen (1997). Unsurprisingly, job creation becomes efficient
under competitive search. Conversely, participation remains insufficient. The reason
is that firms cannot influence individuals’ participation choices. We then surmise that
this inefficiency is likely to hold in any wage-posting model.
2 Endogenous participation with applicant rank-
ing
2.1 Market structure
Apart from the matching process, the market structure used here is very close to
Albrecht et al. (2010) and Gavrel (2011). We study the efficiency of participation in
the following simplified static environment with risk-neutral agents5.
The population (participants and non-participants) has a positive measure n. When
holding a job, workers’ productivities y are distributed according to the (strictly)
increasing c.d.f. F (y) of support [0, 1]. The density F ′(y) is denoted by f(y) (f(y) >
0). When inactive all individuals earn the same positive income z. For expositional
simplicity, it is assumed that z does not depend on y, but the analysis extends to the
case in which z grows with y as long as the increase in domestic output is lower than
the increase in market output. Expressed in words, individuals need to hold a job to
fully take advantage of their skills.
5This static setting helps us present our results with clarity. See Appendix F for the extension
to a dynamic model.
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Participating workers must pay some positive search cost, γ, and find a job with
probability p(., y). They are then unemployed with probability [1 − p(., y)]. In this
case, they all enjoy the same domestic income z as non-participants . All firms
are identical and freely enter the market. Each active firm creates a single vacancy
incurring some positive cost c to that end.
When matched with a worker of productivity y (an event which occurs with probabil-
ity rate q(., y)), a job generates the (private) surplus (y − z). This surplus is divided
between the two parties according to their bargaining strengths. The wage, w(y), of
an employed worker is then given by
w(y) = z + β(y − z) (1)
with β being workers’ bargaining strengths (0 < β < 1).
Other arguments of functions p(., y) and q(., y) will be made explicit when we turn
to the matching process.
2.2 Participation choices
Ignoring corner points, one can surmise that high-skilled workers (workers whose
productivities are higher that some cutoff y∗) will choose to join the labor market,
whereas low-skilled individuals (individuals whose productivities are lower than the
cutoff y∗) will prefer to be inactive. This cutoff is thus determined by the following
migration-equilibrium equation
z = −γ + p(., y∗)w(y∗) + [1− p(., y∗)]z
Or
−γ + p(., y∗)β(y∗ − z) = 0 (2)
In the next paragraph, we shall show that in conformity with intuition, the probability
p(., y) increases with the output y. It follows that
−γ + p(., y)w(y) + [1− p(., y)]z > (<)z ⇐⇒ y > (<)y∗
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Consequently, labor supply has a measure equal to [1−F (y∗)]n while the set of non-
participants has a measure equal to F (y∗)n. Active firms offer a set of jobs of measure
v. Hence the tightness of the labor market, θ, is given by the ratio
θ =
v
[1− F (y∗)]n
As already noted, the main innovative feature of our paper involves the matching
process. Contrary to Albrecht et al. (2010) and Gavrel (2011), (active) firms’ re-
cruitment is not random. As in Moen (1999) and Gavrel (2009, 2012), they rank
their applicants and select the best. As a consequence, workers do not face the same
probability of finding a job. In accordance with empirical evidence, we find that
high-skilled job seekers have a greater chance of success.
2.3 Matching process
We now provide a brief account of the modeling of meetings in the labor market.6
Applying the usual urn-ball model, we assume that each job seeker draws one firm at
random. In general, firms will have several applicants of differing productivity. We
assume that they have full knowledge of the sample of their applicants. They then
recruit the best one.
Let us consider the probability rate, q(., y), for a firm to hire a worker of productivity
y7. One can state the following preliminary result
Lemma 1. With recruitment selection, the probability rate q(., y) (y∗ ≤ y ≤ 1) is
q(., y) = q((v/n), y) = exp
(
−
[1− F (y)]n
v
)
f(y)n
v
(3)
Proof. The proof follows the same line as Gavrel (2012).
The above expression for the rate q((v/n), y) is quite intuitive. As the second term,
6See Gavrel (2012) for a more detailed exposition.
7Notice that the probability for a firm to receive several applications of the same type is zero.
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f(y)n
v
, is the probability rate for a firm to meet at least one applicant of productivity
y, the exponential term, exp
(
− [1−F (y)]n
v
)
, represents the probability of (a firm) not
meeting any applicant of productivity higher than y. Because a firm will not hire
a worker of productivity y if another applicant is more skilled the expression for
q((v/n), y) follows.
Integrating q((v/n), y) on the range [y∗, 1] gives the probability of filling a vacancy,
Q((v/n), y∗). We get
Q((v/n), y∗) = 1− exp
(
−
[1− F (y∗)]n
v
)
(4)
From the probabilities q(., y), we also deduce the probabilities of finding a job. It
follows that
p(., y) = p((v/n), y) = exp
(
−
[1− F (y)]n
v
)
(5)
Integrating [p((v/n), y)f(y)/(1− F (y∗))] on the range [y∗, 1] gives the average prob-
ability of finding a job, P ((v/n), y∗). We obtain
P ((v/n), y∗) = θQ((v/n), y∗)
It is worth noting that neither q((v/n), y) nor p((v/n), y) depend on the cutoff y∗.
This point will have important implications in what follows.
ρ((v/n), y, y∗) will denote the density of the output y among employed workers (i.e.
the set of occupied jobs). This density is defined as follows
ρ((v/n), y, y∗) ≡
q((v/n), y)
Q((v/n), y∗)
(6)
Next, from the density ρ((v/n), y, y∗), we deduce the expected output, y¯, of a job
when matched with a worker
y¯ =
∫ 1
y∗
ρ((v/n), y, y∗)ydy (7)
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3 Equilibrium and efficiency
We now define a labor market equilibrium, and will then study its welfare properties.
3.1 Job creation and equilibrium
As indicated above, firms freely enter the labor market. This means that the profit
expected from a vacancy should be equal to the cost of its creation (c). Job creation
is then formally deduced from the following equation
−c+ (1− β)
∫ 1
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − z)dy = 0 (8)
Consequently, a labor market equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. A laissez-faire equilibrium is a pair (y∗, v) which jointly satisfies equa-
tions(2) and (8).
From the equilibrium pair (y∗, v), one can deduce the equilibrium values of all other
endogenous variables.
3.2 Efficiency
Our welfare criterion is the social surplus (also referred to as the aggregate income).
Denoted by Σ, the social surplus per head is defined as
Σ = (v/n)Q((v/n), y∗)y¯ + [1−Q((v/n), y∗)(v/n)]z − [1− F (y∗)]γ − (v/n)c (9)
In the previous expression, the quantity (v/n)Q((v/n), y∗) measures the employment
rate. It is also equal to P ((v/n), y∗)[1− F (y∗)]
A social optimum is then determined as follows
Definition 2. A social optimum is a pair (y∗, v) which maximizes the social surplus
Σ.
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In what follows, we will restrict the welfare analysis to the neighborhood of a laissez-
faire equilibrium. We first study the impact of participation (job creation) on the
social surplus for a given value of job creation (participation). We will refer to our
results as ”partial” efficiency properties. Partial efficiency should be clearly distin-
guished from constrained efficiency, which is the second step of our investigation.
3.2.1 Partial efficiency of participation
Let us first study the efficiency of the output cutoff y∗.
Differentiating Σ with respect to y∗ gives
∂Σ
∂y∗
= −
v
n
q((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z) + f(y∗)γ
From
v
n
q((v/n), y∗) = p((v/n), y∗)f(y∗)
we deduce that this derivative has the same sign as
Y ≡ γ − p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z)
We obtain the following proposition
Proposition 1a. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, the cutoff y∗ is partially inefficient.
Participation [1− F (y∗)]n is necessarily too low.
Proof. The expression Y can be rewritten as follows
Y = γ − βp((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z)− (1− β)p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z)
Using equation (2), we obtain
Y = −(1− β)p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z) < 0
This proves that in the neighborhood of a laissez-faire equilibrium the cutoff y∗ is
too high whatever the value of job creation v is.
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Q.E.D.
Proposition 1a contradicts the results of Gavrel (2011). In this paper, where firms’
recruitment is random, participation is excessive. This contradiction requires inter-
pretation. The intuition behind it is that, with random recruitment, a decrease in
the cutoff lowers the average output per filled job. As Albrecht et al. (2010) put it,
the marginal participant reduces the average productivity of matches in the market.
On the contrary, when firms rank their applicants, the probability rate, q(., y) for
a firm to hire a worker whose productivity, y, is greater than the cutoff y∗, is not
affected by a decrease in the cutoff.8 Consequently, any participant of productivity y
raises the aggregate income by the amount
[−γ + p((v/n), y)(y − z)].
In a competitive environment, all individuals whose productivities, y, are higher than
the value of inactivity, z, should participate in the market. In this context, the
productivity of the marginal participant should be equal to z. With matching fric-
tions and recruitment selection, all individuals whose expected output (p(., y)y+(1−
p(., y))z−γ) is higher than z should join the labor market. In this case, the expected
output of the marginal participant should be equal to the value of inactivity.
Because productivities are higher than wages (β < 1), the private return to partici-
pation,
[−γ + p((v/n), y)β(y − z)],
is lower than the social return. This clearly shows why the productivity of the
marginal participant is too high with recruitment selection.
This interpretation also explains why there is no value for the bargaining strengths
of workers which could make the laissez-faire equilibrium coincide with a social opti-
mum. When β tends to 1, the entire output goes to workers. The cutoff y∗ becomes
efficient, but job creation is reduced to zero.
8With random recruitment, this probability rate is [(1− e−
1
θ ) f(y)1−F (y∗) ].
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It is worth noting that this insufficiency of participation does not stem from urn-ball
matching by itself, but from recruitment selection. With random recruitment, the
urn-ball matching function is H = v(1 − e−1/θ), which is no more than a particular
specification of the usual CRTS function. Thus, the results would be the same as in
Gavrel (2011).
3.2.2 Partial efficiency of job creation
Regarding the (partial) efficiency of job creation we build on Gavrel (2012) to state
the following proposition:
Proposition 1b. (i) An increase in job creation (v) lowers the expected output (y¯).(ii)
Consequently, in the neighborhood of laissez-faire, job creation is partially inefficient
under the Hosios rule. Firms create too many jobs
Proof. Statement (i) is proved in Appendix A. Let us prove statement (ii). Differ-
entiating Σ with respect to v gives
n
∂Σ
∂v
= Q(.)(1− η(.))(y¯ − z)− c+ vQ(.)
∂y¯(.)
∂v
with η(.) being the elasticity of the probability Q(.) with respect to v (in absolute
values).
Let α(.) denote the elasticity of (y¯ − z) with respect to v (in absolute values).
Since ∂y¯
∂v
< 0, the derivative of Σ can be rewritten as
∂Σ
∂v
=
1
n
[Q(.)(1− η(.)− α(.))(y¯ − z)− c]
On the other hand, equation (8) is equivalent to
Q(.)(1− β)(y¯ − z)− c = 0
Applying the Hosios rule (β = η), we then obtain
∂Σ
∂v
= −
1
n
Q(.)α(.)(y¯ − z) < 0
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This proves that job creation is too high in the neighborhood of an equilibrium,
whatever the value of the cut off y∗ is.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind this result is that, relative to the basic matching model, job
creation acquires a new congestion effect in the presence of recruitment selection.
As market tightness increases, the number of applications that a firm can expect to
receive falls and accordingly the expected maximum output (i.e. the expected value
of the nth order statistic) among its applicants is reduced. In other words, when
the market becomes tighter, firms are compelled to hire lower-skilled workers. This
lowers the average output y¯ (See Appendix A). Since firms do not not internalize this
negative externality, job creation is excessive.
It is worth noting that, with recruitment selection, an increase in the number of
vacancies exerts the same influence as a decrease in the share of skilled workers with
random recruitment.
3.3 Constrained efficiency
3.3.1 Participation
Proposition 1a suggests that any policy measure that tends to raise participation is
likely to improve the efficiency of the labor market. On the other hand, a participation
increase will affect firms’ entry. Hence to assess the value of this conjecture it is
convenient to study the constrained efficiency of the cutoff y∗. See Moen and Rose´n
(2004). This amounts to examining the effect of an increase in the cutoff on the
aggregate income when job creation is set by free-entry (equation (8)).
As equation (8) is treated as a constraint, the social surplus, Σcp, can be rewritten
as follows9
Σcp =
∫ 1
y∗
[p((v/n), y)β(y − z)− γ]f(y)dy (10)
9See Appendix B for detailed calculus.
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On the other hand, according to equation (8) job creation (v) is an implicit function,
v(.), of the participation cutoff y∗. One can see that the derivative v′(y∗) is negative.
The reason for this is that with recruitment selection a participation increase raises
the expected profits of vacancies, prompting firms to enter the market. Differentiating
Σcp with respect to y
∗ gives
∂Σcp
∂y∗
= −f(y∗[p((v/n), y∗)β(y∗ − z)− γ] +
∫ 1
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
β(y − z)f(y)dyv′(y∗)
Using equation (2) and noting that
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
> 0
the following results
∂Σcp
∂y∗
=
∫ 1
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
β(y − z)f(y)dyv′(y∗) < 0
So the participation cutoff appears to be too high. We have then stated the result
below.
Proposition 2. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, participation is constrained suboptimal.
3.3.2 Job creation
Symmetrically, as in Albrecht et al.(2010), we can study the constrained efficiency
of job creation (v). This amounts to appraising the effect of an increase in v on the
social surplus when the participation cutoff is set by individuals’ choices, equation
(2). From (2) we deduce the following derivative of y∗
∂y∗
∂v
= −
(1− F (y∗))(y∗ − z)
vf(y∗)
< 0
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As an increase in job creation raises the probability of getting a job for all workers,
lower-skilled workers find it profitable to enter the market. In other words, the pro-
ductivity of the marginal participant decreases. This indirect effect of job creation is
similar to Albrecht et al..
We then obtain the following expression for the impact on the social surplus
∂Σcv
∂v
=
∂Σ
∂v
+
∂Σ
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂v
Under the Hosios rule, in the neighborhood of laissez-faire, this derivative can be
rewritten as follows (see Proposition 1b)
∂Σcv
∂v
= −
1
n
Q(.)α(.)(y¯ − z) +
∂Σ
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂v
with α(.) being the elasticity of (y¯ − z) with respect to v (in absolute values).
As ∂Σ
∂y∗
< 0 (Proposition 1a), it follows that the first term of the derivative is negative
whereas the second term is positive. The constrained efficiency of job creation appears
to be indeterminate. This contrasts with Albrecht et al. (2010) who obtain the
result that job creation is (constrained) over-optimal under the Hosios rule. The
reason for this is twofold. First, holding the participation cutoff as a constant, the
expected output no longer depends on job creation when recruitment is random (as in
Albrecht et al.). Second , attracting lower-skilled workers improves market efficiency
under recruitment selection, whereas this tends to depress efficiency under random
recruitment. See our comment on Proposition 1a.
4 Introducing a minimum wage
Laissez-faire is inefficient. What should be done to deal with this market failure?
In this section we provide a rationale for adopting a mandatory minimum wage.
We show that introducing a minimum wage improves the efficiency of the economy
(measured by the aggregate income). This improvement of efficiency does not re-
quire workers’ bargaining strengths to be low. It holds for any value of the surplus
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shares. Moreover a ”small” minimum also appears to raise the expected incomes of
all participants.
We first study the effects of introducing a minimum wage on participation, labor
demand and unemployment. This study is interesting by itself as the vertical differ-
entiation of workers may be a better assumption than match specific productivities in
assessing the merits of the minimum wage10. Surprisingly, we find that job creation
is stimulated. We explain how recruitment selection causes this unexpected result.
4.1 The labor market in the presence of a binding minimum
wage
In the presence of a binding minimum wage, wˆ, low-ability workers (workers whose
productivities are lower that some trigger yˆ) now earn that minimum, whereas the
wages of high-ability workers (workers whose productivities are greater that yˆ) are
still subject to bargaining. Formally, we have
w(yˆ) = z + β(yˆ − z) = wˆ
and
y∗ ≤ y ≤ yˆ ⇐⇒ w(y) = wˆ
yˆ ≤ y ≤ 1⇐⇒ w(y) = z + β(y − z).
Notice that the first equation determines the trigger yˆ.
The presence of a mandatory wage has two consequences. First, the equation which
determines the cutoff y∗ is now written as follows
z = −γ + p((v/n), y∗)wˆ + (1− p((v/n), y∗))z
Or
γ = p((v/n), y∗)(wˆ − z) (11)
10Indeed, practical relevance requires that lower-skilled workers are on the minimum. Such a
prediction is not compatible with horizontally differentiated workers.
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For a given value of job creation v, an increase in the minimum wage wˆ lowers the
cutoff y∗, consequently increasing the participation level. We will show that this
intuitive result holds true when job creation is endogenous.
Next, when matched with a worker whose productivity lies on the range [y∗, yˆ], a job
generates the profit (y − wˆ). Otherwise the profit remains equal to [(1− β)(y − z)].
As a consequence, the job creation equation must be rewritten as
−c+
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − wˆ)dy + (1− β)
∫ 1
yˆ
q((v/n), y)(y − z)dy = 0 (12)
This leads to the following definition
Definition 3. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a labor market equilibrium
is a pair (y∗, v) which jointly satisfies equations (11) and (12).
In what follows we examine the implications of introducing a binding minimum in
the neighborhood of an equilibrium where all wages are bargained. In other words,
this amounts to studying the effects of a (small) increase in the minimum wage in
a situation where the legal minimum wˆ is initially equal to the bargained wage:
[z + β(y∗ − z)]. This also means that in our benchmark, the cutoff y∗ coincides with
the trigger yˆ.
4.2 Effects of a minimum wage increase
With respect to the effects of introducing a small but binding minimum wage (wˆ
becomes higher than [z + β(y∗ − z)]), we first state the following proposition
Proposition 3. Introducing a minimum wage lowers the cutoff (y∗) and raises job
creation (v). Despite the increase in labor demand, the unemployment rate (1 − P )
rises but the employment rate (P (1− F (y∗))) is enhanced.
Proof. See Appendix C.
At first glance this increase in labor demand might look surprising. The intuition
behind it is very simple. Introducing a (small) minimum wage makes lower-skilled
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workers (infra-marginal workers) join the market. Because their productivities re-
main higher than the wages they earn when holding a job, this tends to raise the
expected profits of an offered job. On the other hand the wage increase lowers the
profits of matches with incumbent workers on the minimum. In the neighborhood
of laissez-faire this negative effect on expected profits is very small. Job creation is
then stimulated. Conversely, implementing a minimum wage lowers market tightness,
consequently increasing the unemployment rate. However, employment rises, so that
fewer workers are jobless, whether inactive or unemployed.
It is worth noting that with vertically differentiated workers and ranking of can-
didates, the minimum wage effects are quite different from the usual search and
matching setting (Flinn 2006, 2011). When all workers have the same (expected11)
productivities, introducing a minimum wage tends to lower the (expected) profit of
all matches,12 leading then to a reduction of job creation. On the contrary, in our
model, a minimum wage only affects the profit of matches with low-skilled workers.
4.3 Minimum wage and market efficiency
We can now study the effect of implementing a minimum wage on the efficiency of
the labor market.
Differentiating the social surplus Σ with respect to the minimum wage wˆ yields
∂Σ
∂wˆ
=
∂Σ
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
+
∂Σ
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂wˆ
We have seen that the cutoff y∗ decreases with a minimum wage increase (Proposition
3). This increase in participation tends to improve market efficiency (Proposition 1a).
On the other hand job creation is enhanced (Proposition 3). We have shown that with
applicant ranking this increase in labor demand tends to depress market efficiency
under the Hosios rule (Proposition 1b). So, a priori, the impact on the social surplus
would be indeterminate. However, when resulting from the introduction of a minimum
11Flinn assumes match specific productivities.
12Independently of the increase in the value of being unemployed that occurs in a dynamic setting.
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wage, the stimulus to job creation follows from the decrease in the participation cutoff,
which improves the expected income of vacancies. This is the reason why we can state
the result below.
Proposition 4. Introducing a ”small” but binding minimum wage improves the
efficiency of the labor market.
Proof. Proposition 4 results from the constrained inefficiency of participation (Propo-
sition 2). See Appendix D.
Proposition 4 contradicts Gavrel (2011) where the efficiency of the labor market is
improved by subsidizing non-participants (i.e. making inactivity more attractive to
workers). The reason for this is that in this paper (as well as in Albrecht et al. 2010)
random recruitment creates a ”mixing” effect which tends to lower the social surplus
when low-ability workers join the market (see the comment on Proposition 1b). On
the contrary, with applicant ranking, the presence of bad workers in the market does
not affect the probability for a firm to hire a good one. That only enhances the prob-
ability of filling the vacancies in a less productive but efficient manner. Proposition
4 also contrasts the usual search-matching model in which minimum wage efficiency
critically depends on workers’ bargaining strengths.
As mentioned in the introduction, different authors prefer to focus on the value of
being unemployed in lieu of the social surplus. In our static setting with heteroge-
neous workers this amounts to examining how the expected incomes of all individuals
are affected by the minimum wage. Let us first consider the individuals whom the
minimum wage prompts to enter the market. The expected incomes of these new
participants obviously rise; otherwise they would remain inactive. Let us now turn
to the workers who already participated in the market. As labor demand rises, all
incumbent workers have a higher probability of finding a job. See equation (5). Be-
cause workers earn the minimum wage only if it is binding, we obtain the following
corollary to Proposition 3:
Result. A ”small” minimum wage raises the expected incomes of all participating
workers.
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As introducing a minimum wage lowers market tightness (Proposition 3), this result
might look counterintuitive. The intuition behind this point is that the entry of
lower-skilled workers does not directly affect the probabilities with which incumbent
workers get a job. New entrants find it more difficult to obtain a job (relative to
incumbent) but this is compensated for by the minimum wage.
5 Other public policies
5.1 Basic income
Introducing a minimum wage is a simple policy measure. Nevertheless, as French
(2012) points out in his review of Flinn (2011), other policy measures could be con-
sidered. We here study the implications of a lump-sum subsidy to participants paid
for by a neutral tax13. See Holmlund (1998). This income, denoted by a, is received
by all participants whether they find a job or not. Although non-participants do not
profit from it, this subsidy resembles a basic income.14
In the presence of such a basic income, the surplus of a match remains equal to (y−z).
Consequently, the equilibrium equation for job creation is left unchanged.
On the other hand, the condition for migration equilibrium is now written as
z = −γ+p(., y∗)[w(y∗)+a]+[1−p(., y∗)](z+a) = −γ+p(., y∗)[z+a+β(y∗−z)]+[1−p(., y∗)](z+a).
Or
−(γ − a) + p(., y∗)β(y∗ − z) = 0 (13)
This basic income clearly acts as a subsidy to job search, tending then to make
participation more attractive. In Appendix E1, we show that an increase in the
subsidy a necessarily lowers the cutoff y∗. So, as a consequence of Proposition 2,
implementing a (small) basic income improves market efficiency.
13One can also consider the case in which subsidies are financed by a tax on job creation. Not
surprisingly, results are ambiguous.
14This lump-sum subsidy also resembles certain elements of a tax credit conditional on employ-
ment, like EITC in US or WTC in UK.
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5.2 Unemployment compensation
As workers are assumed to be risk-neutral, unemployment insurance does not really
make sense in our setup. See Pissarides (2001). Nevertheless unemployment compen-
sation can be used as a means of attracting more individuals in the labor market.
Contrary to a basic income, introducing unemployment benefits (denoted by b) changes
the expression for the (private) surplus of a match. As a consequence, the job creation
equation must be rewritten as
−c+ (1− β)
∫ 1
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − z − b)dy = 0 (14)
On the other hand, the condition for migration equilibrium becomes
z = −γ+p(., y∗)w(y∗)+[1−p(., y∗)](z+b) = −γ+p(., y∗)[z+b+β(y∗−z−b)]+[1−p(., y∗)](z+b).
Or
−(γ − b) + p(., y∗)β(y∗ − z − b) = 0 (15)
Holding job creation (v) as a constant, unemployment compensation also tends to
lower the participation trigger y∗. More workers enter the labor market because
they receive the income b if they are not successful in finding a job. In Appendix
E2, we show that unemployment compensation actually increases participation when
job creation is endogenous. But, due to the increase in all wages, the impact on job
creation is indeterminate, even in the neighborhood of laissez-faire. Despite of this, we
can state that introducing (small) unemployment benefits improves market efficiency.
To that end we make use of previous (partial) inefficiency results (Proposition 1a,b)
when job creation is reduced. In the reverse case the proof is similar to that of
Proposition 2. See Appendix E2.
Which policy is better for welfare? To answer this question, numerical simulations
would indicate the extent to which these different measures can raise the aggregate
income (outside the neighborhood of laissez-faire). We can however mention two
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arguments which can be made in favor of minimum wages. First, unlike subsidies
to workers, introducing a minimum wage does not require the collection of taxes,
consequently creating administrative costs. Second, and more importantly, to be
efficient, subsidies to participants imply that their job search is monitored. This will
generate a dead weight loss.
6 Final comments
Using a matching model with vertically differentiated workers, we show that in the
presence of recruitment selection, participation in the labor market is insufficient.
Insofar it is not too large, a minimum wage improves the efficiency of the economy
by rendering activity more attractive to low-skilled workers. This result holds despite
an increase in unemployment, implying then that the effects of minimum wages on
unemployment are not what really matters. Subsidies to participants also enhance
the aggregate income.
In order to state analytical insights, the study was restricted to the neighborhood of
laissez-faire. A calibration of the dynamic model would allow one to go beyond and
to compare the efficiency of different policy measures. Numerical analysis would also
provide an assessment of the optimum minimum wage. This a topic for further work.
From an empirical perspective these analytical insights also make possible an al-
ternative interpretation of the results from Card and Krueger’s (1994) case study.
According to these authors, the observed employment increase in the fast-food in-
dustry is likely to result either from a higher inflow of workers into this industry, or
from a lower outflow. See Portugal and Cardoso (2006) for empirical findings that
coincide with this explanation. In an earlier paper, we show that a minimum wage
can induce an employment increase in the low-skill sector by prompting employees
to reduce the intensity of their (on-the-job) search for better-paid jobs. A larger
proportion of vacancies is filled. However, due to the reduction of job creation, the
(possible) employment growth in low-skill industries is accompanied by a macroeco-
nomic fall in employment. This would imply that one cannot infer macroeconomic
predictions from sectoral results. See Gavrel et al. (2012). The present paper clearly
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weakens this pessimistic view of minimum wages. By giving firms the opportunity
of filling their vacancies with new participants, a mandatory wage instead stimulates
job creation when employers are selective.
To conclude, we would like to emphasize that both (perfect) applicant ranking and
random recruitment are strong assumptions. In the real world firms carry out a cost-
benefit analysis when deciding on their recruitment process. In fact their selectiveness
should be modeled as an endogenous variable that is likely to depend on market
tightness as well as on the distribution of workers’ productivities. Another line for
further research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1b, Statement (i)
We here prove that an increase in v reduces the expected output y¯
One can show that the derivative of ρ((v/n), y, y∗) with respect to v has the same
sign as the following expression
[
n
v
(1− F (y)− 1]Q− (Q− 1)(1− F (y∗)
n
v
The previous expression is a decreasing function of y.
As
∫ 1
y∗
∂ρ((v/n), y, y∗)
∂v
dy = 0
there exists some positive output y˜ (y˜ > y∗) such that
∂ρ((v/n), y˜, y∗)
∂v
= 0
and
y < (>)y˜ ⇐⇒
∂ρ((v/n), y, y∗)
∂v
> (<)0
This implies that, ∀y ∈ [y∗, y˜[ ∪ ]y˜, 1]
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∂ρ((v/n), y, y∗)
∂v
y <
∂ρ((v/n), y, y∗)
∂v
y˜
Consequently we obtain
∂y¯
∂v
<
∫ 1
y∗
∂ρ((v/n), y, y∗)
∂v
y˜dy = 0
This proves that job creation lowers the expected output.
Appendix B: Constrained efficiency of participation
The aggregate income, Σ, can be rewritten as
Σ = −(v/n)c+ (v/n)Q((v/n), y∗)(1− β)(y¯ − z) + (v/n)Q((v/n), y∗)[z + β(y¯ − z)]+
[1−Q((v/n), y∗)(v/n)]z − [1− F (y∗)]γ
As equation (8) is treated as a constraint, we obtain the following expression for the
constrained (social) surplus
Σcp = (v/n)Q((v/n), y
∗)β(y¯ − z)− [1− F (y∗)]γ + z
Or
Σcp =
∫ 1
y∗
[(v/n)q((v/n), y)β(y − z)− f(y)γ]dy + z
From (v/n)q((v/n), y) = p((v/n), y)f(y), we deduce
∂Σcp
∂y∗
=
∫ 1
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂y∗
β(y − z)f(y)dy − [p((v/n), y∗)β(y∗ − z)− γ]f(y∗)
Using equation (2), we obtain
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∂Σcp
∂y∗
=
∫ 1
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂y∗
β(y − z)f(y)dy
On the other hand, equation (8) implies that ∀y ∈ [y∗, 1]
∂p((v/n), y)
∂y∗
=
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
v′(y∗) < 0
As v′(y∗) < 0 (see par- 3.3.1), this shows that
∂Σcp
∂y∗
< 0 and proves Proposition 2.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
Let J denote the expected profit of an offered vacancy (gross of job opening costs)
J ≡ J((v/n), yˆ, y∗, wˆ) =
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − wˆ)dy + (1− β)
∫ 1
yˆ
q((v/n), y)(y − z)dy
In the neighborhood of the laissez-faire equilibrium (Definition 2), the result is ob-
tained
∂J(.)
∂y∗
= −(y∗ − wˆ)q((v/n), y∗) = −(1− β)(y∗ − z)q((v/n), y∗) < 0
∂J(.)
∂yˆ
= 0
∂J(.)
∂wˆ
= −
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)dy = 0
Let us now turn to the effect of job creation v on J(.). Let H denote
H ≡
∫ 1
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − z)dy
Integrating H by parts gives
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H = 1− z − p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z)−
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)dy
In the neighborhood of laissez-faire, the derivative of J with respect to v is (very)
close to
(1− β)
∂H
∂v
From
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
> 0
we deduce
∂H
∂v
= −
∂p((v/n), y∗)
∂v
(y∗ − z)−
∫ 1
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
dy < −
∂p((v/n), y∗)
∂v
(y∗ − z)
It results that
∂J(.)
∂v
< −(1− β)
∂p((v/n), y∗)
∂v
(y∗ − z) < 0
Now, differentiating equation (12) yields
−(1− β)(y∗ − z)q((v/n), y∗)dy∗ +
∂J(.)
∂v
dv = 0
From the two previous relations, we deduce
0 >
dv
dy∗
> −
q((v/n), y∗)
∂p((v/n),y∗)
∂v
.
As
∂p((v/n), y∗)
∂v
= p((v/n), y∗)[1− F (y∗)]
n
v2
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and
q((v/n), y∗) = p((v/n), y∗)f(y∗)
n
v
we obtain
dv
dy∗
> −
vf(y∗)
1− F (y∗)
Next, differentiating equation (11) gives
1 +
n
v
[f(y∗) +
1− F (y∗)
v
dv
dy∗
](wˆ − z)
∂y∗
∂wˆ
= 0
From the previous inequality, we get
[f(y∗) +
1− F (y∗)
v
dv
dy∗
](wˆ − z) =
1− F (y∗)
v
[
vf(y∗)
1− F (y∗)
+
dv
dy∗
](wˆ − z) > 0
This proves that introducing a minimum wage lowers the cutoff y∗. We already
know that a decrease in y∗ is associated with an increase in v ( dv
dy∗
< 0). Therefore,
introducing a minimum wage raises job creation.
From the same equation (11), we deduce
∂θ
∂wˆ
= −
θ2
wˆ − z
< 0
This states that introducing a minimum raises the (average) unemployment rate of
participating workers.
The employment rate, [1− F (y∗)]P (.) can be written as
[1− F (y∗)]P (.) = Q(.)
v
n
We know that introducing a minimum wage increases v and lowers θ. Consequently,
Q(.) rises. This shows that the employment rate is enhanced, completing then the
proof of Proposition 3.
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
In the presence of a binding minimum wage, the aggregate income can be rewritten
as
Σ = (v/n)[−c+
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − wˆ)dy +
∫ 1
yˆ
(1− β)q((v/n), y)(y − z)dy]
+(v/n)[
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)wˆdy+
∫ 1
yˆ
q((v/n), y)(z+β(y−z))]dy+[1−Q((v/n), y∗)(v/n)]z−[1−F (y∗)]γ
From the job creation equation (12), we deduce
Σ = (v/n)[
∫ yˆ
y∗
q((v/n), y)wˆdy +
∫ 1
yˆ
q((v/n), y)(z + β(y − z))dy]
+[1−Q((v/n), y∗)(v/n)]z − [1− F (y∗)]γ
Differentiating Σ with respect to wˆ gives
∂Σ
∂wˆ
= [
∫ yˆ
y∗
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
f(y)(wˆ − z)dy +
∫ 1
yˆ
∂p((v/n), y)
∂v
f(y)β(y − z)dy]
∂v
∂wˆ
−[p((v/n), y∗)(wˆ − z)− γ]f(y∗)
∂y∗
∂wˆ
From Proposition 3, we know that ∂v
∂wˆ
> 0. On the other hand we have ∂p((v/n),y)
∂v
> 0.
From the condition for migration equilibrium (11), we deduce that introducing a
minimum wage improves market efficiency.
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Appendix E: Other public policies
E.1 Basic income
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3 (Appendix C), we obtain
dv
dy∗
> −
vf(y∗)
1− F (y∗)
Next, differentiating equation (13) gives
1 + βp((v/n), y∗){1 + (y∗ − z)
(1− F (y∗))n
v2
[
dv
dy∗
+
vf(y∗)
1− F (y∗)
]}
∂y∗
∂a
= 0
From the previous inequality, we deduce
1 + (y∗ − z)
(1− F (y∗))n
v2
[
dv
dy∗
+
vf(y∗)
1− F (y∗)
] > 0
This proves that introducing a basic income (a) lowers the cutoff y∗.
E.2 Unemployment compensation
Participation
Let us consider the equilibrium equation for job creation (14). From
∫ 1
y∗
q((v/n), y)(y − z − b)dy = 1− z − b− p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z − b)−
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)dy
we deduce that (14) can be rewritten as
−c+ (1− β)[1− z − b− p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z − b)−
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)dy] = 0
On the other hand, the participation equation (15) gives
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p((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z − b) =
γ − b
β
Substitution into the job creation equation yields
−c+ (1− β)[1− z − b−
γ − b
β
−
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)dy] = 0
Or
−c+ (1− β)[
β(1− z)− γ
β
+
1− β
β
b−
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)dy] = 0
Let us now state that unemployment compensation (b) lowers the participation cutoff
(y∗). Suppose that the derivative ∂y
∗
∂b
is positive. From the job creation equation (as
previously rewritten) we deduce ∂v
∂b
> 0. Conversely the participation equation (15)
imposes that ∂v
∂b
< 0. This contradiction proves that unemployment compensation
enhances participation.
Efficiency
As the impact on job creation is indeterminate we are led to distinguish between the
two cases.
Case 1. ∂v
∂b
≤ 0
In this case we use Propositions 1a,b. The derivative of Σ can be written as
∂Σ
∂b
=
∂Σ
∂v
∂v
∂b
+
∂Σ
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂b
From Propositions 1a-b, we know that, in the neighborhood of laissez-faire, ∂Σ
∂v
is neg-
ative under the Hosios condition, while ∂Σ
∂y∗
is always (strictly) negative. As ∂y
∗
∂b
< 0,
we obtain ∂Σ
∂b
> 0. This proves that, in this first case, introducing (small) unemploy-
ment benefits improves market efficiency under the Hosios condition.
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Case 2. ∂v
∂b
> 0
In this case, we note that Σ can be written as
Σ =
v
n
[−c+(1−β)Q(.)(y¯−z−b)]+(1−β)
v
n
Q(.)(b+z)+β
v
n
Q(.)y¯+(1−
v
n
Q(.))z−(1−F (y∗)γ
As the pair (v, y∗) satisfies (14), Σ is reduced to
Σ = (1− β)
v
n
Q(.)(b+ z) + β
v
n
Q(.)y¯ + (1−
v
n
Q(.))z − (1− F (y∗)γ
Or
Σ = (1− β)
v
n
Q(.)b+ β
∫ 1
y∗
p((v/n), y)f(y)(y − z)dy + z − (1− F (y∗)γ
One can check that Σ is an increasing function in b as in v. Differentiating Σ with
respect to y∗ gives
∂Σ
∂y∗
= [γ − b− βp((v/n), y∗)(y∗ − z − b) + (1− p((v/n), y∗))b]f(y∗)
From equation (15), we deduce that the previous derivative is close to zero in the
neighborhood of laissez-faire. This proves that (small) benefits enhance the aggregate
income.
Appendix F: Extension to a dynamic setting
This appendix provides an extension of the main points of the analysis to a dynamic
setting15. We first state that participation remains (constrained) suboptimal. Next
we prove that introducing a minimum wage still raises participation and job creation.
Consequently, a small minimum wage improves market efficiency. For the sake of
simplicity, time is discrete16. It is also assumed that the destruction probability of
15Unless otherwise stated, the notation used is the same as in text.
16Following Moen (1999) and Gavrel (2012), switching to continuous time is straightforward.
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jobs, s, does not depend on workers’ productivities. For the sake of expositional
simplicity, the welfare analysis is restricted to the case in which the time preference
rate, r, is very close to zero. See Hosios (1990).
From the usual Bellman relations, we deduce the equilibrium equation for job creation
−c+
∫ 1
y∗
q(y)
y − z + γ
r + s+ βp(y)
dy = 0 (16)
with c being the cost at keeping a vacancy open.
Notice that in this equation, the term S(y) = y−z+γ
r+s+p(y)
, which represents the surplus
of a match with a worker of productivity y, should grow with y. Ranking workers by
ability would not otherwise make sense. This consistency requirement imposes that
1− βq(y)S(y) > 0
This existence condition is assumed to be satisfied henceforth. It comes from the fact
that the ranking of applicants by ability is ordinal. See Moscarini (1997).
With respect to participation, the equation for migration equilibrium now is
γ = βp(y∗)S(y∗) (17)
In this dynamic setting, the distribution of productivities, F (y), among the total pop-
ulation remains exogenous, but the distribution among unemployed workers becomes
endogenous. It is denoted by G(y) and defined on [y∗, 1]. Its density is g(y). Below,
we study how this endogenous distribution is affected by an increase in job creation
or in participation.
F.1 Preliminary results
F.1.1 Flow equilibrium and hiring probabilities
Let u denote the number of unemployed workers (searching for a job). The mar-
ket tightness, θ, is then determined by the ratio v/u. For almost all z > y∗, flow
equilibrium imposes the condition that
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s[f(z)n− g(z)u] = p(z)g(z)u
Integrating the previous equation on [y∗, 1] gives
s[(1− F (y∗))n− u] = P (θ)u
with P (θ) =
∫ 1
y∗ p(y)g(y)dy = θ(1 − e
(−1/θ)) being the average probability of an
unemployed worker finding a job.
Combining the two latter equations yields
sg(z) + θq(z) =
s+ P (θ)
1− F (y∗)
f(z)
By integrating this equation on [y, 1], we obtain
s[1−G(y)] + θ[1− p(y)] =
s+ P (θ)
1− F (y∗)
[1− F (y)] (18)
As
ln p(y) = −
1−G(y)
θ
equation (18) can be rewritten as
p(y) + s ln p(y) = 1−
s+ P (θ)
θ
1− F (y)
1− F (y∗)
(19)
As θ = v/u and
u =
s(1− F (y∗))n
s+ P (θ)
we also have
p(y) + s ln p(y) = 1−
s(1− F (y))n
v
(20)
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According to the above equation, the probabilities p(y) still grow with a job creation
increase when taking into account the incidence of market tightness on the repartition
function G(y). Likewise, they remain independent of the cutoff y∗. Consequently their
derivatives (with respect to y), q(y) = p(y)g(y)
θ
, are also independent of y∗.
F.1.2 Employment shares and market tightness
In the following, we will need to know how the employment shares ρ(y) are affected
by θ. To that end we make use of (19). We have
ρ(y) =
q(y)
Q(θ)
=
p(y)g(y)
P (θ)
From
g(y) =
1
1− F (y∗)
s+ P (θ)
s+ p(y)
f(y)
we deduce
ρ(y) =
1
1− F (y∗)
p(y)(s+ P (θ))
(s+ p(y))P (θ)
f(y)
Using F.1.1, we obtain that the derivative of ρ(y) with respect to θ has the same sign
as
Γ =
1
p(y)(s+ p(y))
∂p(y)
∂θ
−
P ′(θ)
P (s+ P )
Differentiating (19) gives
∂p(y)
∂θ
=
p(y)
s+ p(y)
[
s
θ2
−Q′(θ)]
1− F (y)
1− F (y∗)
Substitution into the expression Γ yields
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Γ =
1− F (y)
(s+ p(y))2
[
s
θ2
−Q′(θ)]
1
1− F (y∗)
−
P ′(θ)
P (s+ P )
This shows that ∂ρ(y)
∂θ
is a strictly decreasing function in y.
As
∫ 1
y∗
ρ(y)dy = 1
it results by continuity that there exists some median output y˜ (1 > y˜ > y∗) such
that
∂ρ(y˜)
∂θ
= 0
and
y < (>)y˜ ⇐⇒
∂ρ(y)
∂θ
> (<)0.
This preliminary result is used to state that, for any (strictly) increasing function
ϕ(y) defined on [y∗, 1],
∫ 1
y∗
∂ρ(y)
∂θ
ϕ(y)dy < 0
The proof is a straightforward extension of Appendix A. Notice that setting ϕ(y) = y
shows that an increase in market tightness still reduces the average output, meaning
then that the externality which was highlighted in the static model (Proposition 1b)
extends to the dynamic setting.
On the other hand, because a market tightness increase lowers S(y), setting ϕ(y) =
S(y) shows that
∫ 1
y∗
ρ(y)S(y)dy
is a decreasing function of θ.
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F.1.3 Job creation
Here we can study the derivatives of
H ≡
∫ 1
y∗
q(y)S(y)dy = Q(θ)
∫ 1
y∗
ρ(y)S(y)dy
with respect to θ (hence to v) as well as to y∗.
(i) We first show that the derivative ∂H
∂θ
, which is negative, is bounded above.
Integrating H by parts gives
H = S(1)− p(y∗)S(y∗)−
∫ 1
y∗
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
[1− βq(y)S(y)]dy
−p(y∗)S(y∗) is a decreasing function of θ. On the other hand, developing the deriva-
tive of the integral yields
−
∫ 1
y∗
∂ p(y)
r+s+βp(y)
∂θ
[1− βq(y)S(y)]dy + β
∫ 1
y∗
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
∂(q(y)S(y))
∂θ
Due to the existence condition, we have
−
∫ 1
y∗
∂ p(y)
r+s+βp(y)
∂θ
[1− βq(y)S(y)]dy < 0
The last term of the derivative can be rewritten as
β
∫ 1
y∗
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
∂(q(y)S(y))
∂θ
= β
∫ 1
y∗
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
q(y)
∂S(y)
∂θ
dy
+β
∫ 1
y∗
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
S(y)Q′(θ)ρ(y)dy + β
∫ 1
y∗
Q
p(y)
r + s+ βp(y)
S(y)
∂ρ(y)
∂θ
dy
As ∂S(y)
∂θ
< 0, the first term of the right hand side (of the previous equation) is
strictly negative. From Q′(θ) < 0, we deduce that the same holds for the second
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term. Consider the expression p(y)
r+s+βp(y)
S(y). This is a strictly increasing function of
y. So, by setting ϕ(y) = p(y)
r+s+βp(y)
S(y), we obtain that the third term is also (strictly)
negative (See F.1.2).
This shows that
∂H(θ, y∗)
∂θ
< −
∂p(y∗)S(y∗)
∂θ
< 0 (21)
Differentiating θ with respect to v gives
∂θ
∂v
=
1
u
−
v
u2
∂u
∂v
From17
∂u
∂v
= −
u
s+ P
Q(1− η)
∂θ
∂v
we deduce
∂θ
∂v
=
s+ P
(s+ ηP )u
> 0
Thus, we also obtain
∂H(v, y∗)
∂v
< −
∂p(y∗)S(y∗)
∂v
< 0 (22)
(ii) We now turn to the derivative of H with respect to y∗. As q(y)S(y) does not
depend on y∗ for all y in ]y∗, 1] (see equation (20)), this derivative reduces to
∂H(v, y∗)
∂y∗
= −q(y∗)S(y∗) < 0 (23)
So, according to the job creation equation (16), an increase in participation (a decrease
in y∗) stimulates job creation: v′(y∗) < 0.
17Remember that η(θ) is the elasticity of Q(θ) with respect to θ in absolute values.
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F.2 Constrained (in)efficiency of participation
Let l(y) and u(y) denote the employment and unemployment levels of y-workers
respectively. The social surplus per period is defined as follows18
Σ =
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)ydy +
∫ 1
y∗
u(y)(z − γ)dy + F (y∗)nz − vc
Let l be the total employment level. As l(y) = q(y)l
Q
and sl = Qv, the job creation
equation (16) can be written as
−vc+
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)[y − w(y)]dy = 0
with w(y) being the wage of y-workers.
Σ is also equal to
Σ = −vc+
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)[y − w(y)]dy +
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)w(y)dy +
∫ 1
y∗
u(y)(z − γ)dy + F (y∗)nz
As equation (16) is treated as a constraint, the social surplus is reduced to
Σcp =
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)w(y)dy +
∫ 1
y∗
[f(y)n− l(y)](z − γ)dy + F (y∗)nz
Or
Σcp =
∫ 1
y∗
l(y)[w(y)− z + γ]dy − γ[1− F (y∗)]n+ nz
As usual, wages satisfy
w(y) = rU(y) + β(y − rU(y))
with U(y) being the asset value of unemployment:
18In this efficiency study, the interest rate is close to zero.
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rU(y) = z − γ + p(y)βS(y)
Σcp is a function of the form
Σcp = Σcp(v(y
∗), y∗)
with v(y∗) being the implicit (decreasing) function derived from equation (16).
We first show that the direct derivative
∂Σcp(v,y∗)
∂y∗
is reduced to zero in a laissez-faire
equilibrium. Noting that
l(y) =
p(y)
s+ p(y)
f(y)n
one can see that this derivative is proportional to
γ −
p(y∗)
s+ p(y∗)
[w(y∗)− z + γ]
Because
w(y∗)− z + γ = rU(y∗)− z + γ + β(y∗ − rU(y∗)) = β(s+ p(y∗))S(y∗)
we find that this direct derivative is zero in a laissez-faire equilibrium (equation (17)).
Let us now consider the derivative of Σcp with respect to v. As p(y) grows with v, it
results that l(y), rU(y) and, w(y) are increasing functions of v.
From F.1.3, we know that v′(y∗) < 0. Consequently, we obtain
∂Σcp(v(y
∗), y∗)
∂y∗
=
∂Σcp(v(y
∗), y∗)
∂v(y∗)
v′(y∗) < 0
This states that participation is constrained suboptimal.
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F.3 Introducing a minimum wage
In the presence of a binding minimum, the job creation equation is rewritten as19
−c+
∫ yˆ
y∗
q(y)
y − wˆ
r + s
dy + (1− β)
∫ 1
yˆ
q(y)S(y)dy (24)
while the condition for migration equilibrium becomes
γ = p(y∗)
wˆ − z + γ
r + s+ p(y∗)
(25)
F.3.1 Impacts on participation and job creation
We claim that a small minimum wage stimulates job creation and participation20. To
that end, let J denote the following quantity
J =
∫ yˆ
y∗
q(y)
y − wˆ
r + s
dy + (1− β)
∫ 1
yˆ
q(y)S(y)dy
As in the static study, we examine the implications of introducing a binding min-
imum in the neighborhood of an equilibrium where all wages are bargained. As a
consequence, we obtain (see paragraph F.1.3)
∂J
∂wˆ
= 0
∂J
∂v
< −
y∗ − wˆ
r + s
∂p(y∗)
∂v
< 0
∂J
∂y∗
= −
y∗ − wˆ
r + s
q(y∗) < 0
We also have
19Remember that yˆ is the productivity level such that the bargained wage coincides with the
minimum wage, wˆ.
20This result holds for any positive interest rate.
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∂J
∂yˆ
= 0
Differentiating (25) gives
(r + s)(wˆ − z + γ)
[r + s+ p(y∗)]2
[
∂p(y∗)
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
+ q(y∗)
∂y∗
∂wˆ
] +
p(y∗)
r + s+ p(y∗)
= 0
This shows that
∂p(y∗)
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
+ q(y∗)
∂y∗
∂wˆ
< 0 (26)
On the other hand, differentiating (24) yields
−
∂J
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
=
∂J
∂y∗
∂y∗
∂wˆ
Suppose by contradiction that ∂y
∗
∂wˆ
> 0. As ∂J
∂v
< 0 and ∂J
∂y∗
< 0, we should have
∂v
∂wˆ
< 0. This implies
−
∂J
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
<
y∗ − wˆ
r + s
∂p(y∗)
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
We then obtain
y∗ − wˆ
r + s
[
∂p(y∗)
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
+ q(y∗)
∂y∗
∂wˆ
] > 0
This inequality contradicts (26).
It results that ∂y
∗
∂wˆ
< 0 and ∂v
∂wˆ
> 0. A small minimum wage stimulates job creation
and participation.
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F.3.2 Impact on welfare
We claim that introducing a small minimum wage improves market efficiency21. This
result stems from the constrained inefficiency of participation.
As equation (24) is satisfied, the social surplus per period reduces to
Σ =
∫ yˆ
y∗
l(y)wˆdy +
∫ 1
yˆ
l(y)w(y)dy +
∫ 1
y∗
u(y)(−γ + z)dy + F (y∗)nz
Notice that in the previous equation, w(y) is the bargained wage (defined as in the
constrained efficiency study, F.2) for y ≥ yˆ.
Σ can be rewritten as follows
Σ =
∫ yˆ
y∗
l(y)(wˆ−z+γ)dy+
∫ 1
yˆ
l(y)(w(y)−z+γ)dy+(1−F (y∗))n(−γ+z)+F (y∗)nz
Let us consider the derivatives of Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗). As yˆ initially coincides with y∗, we
have
∂Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗)
∂wˆ
= 0
Besides, we always have
∂Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗)
∂yˆ
= 0
Because p(y) grows with v, l(y) and w(y) are increasing functions of v. Consequently
∂Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗)
∂v
> 0
On the other hand the derivative of Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗) with respect to y∗ is
∂Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗)
∂y∗
= −l(y∗)(wˆ − z + γ) + f(y∗)nγ
21In this welfare study, the interest rate is very close to zero.
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From equation (25), we deduce that this derivative is close to zero when r tends to
zero. Consequently, we obtain
Σ′(wˆ) =
∂Σ(wˆ, yˆ, v, y∗)
∂v
∂v
∂wˆ
> 0
Introducing a (small) minimum wage improves market efficiency.
Appendix G: Competitive search
The purpose of this appendix is to consider an alternative wage-setting mechanism,
referred to as competitive search. This wage-setting mechanism was introduced by
Moen (1997) in an economy which is divided into a very large number of sub-markets.
In each sub-market, prior to search, firms post a wage that maximizes expected profits
for a given expected income of workers. Moen (1997) finds that job creation is efficient
under these assumptions.
In the presence of vertically differentiated workers, firms are led to commit to wage
functions that relate wages to productivities. In addition, there are as many con-
straints as productivity levels. The analysis is restricted to a symmetric equilibrium.
Furthermore, in what we regard as a first pass, participating workers do not know
the distribution of y among the queues of applicants. This implies that firms cannot
make use of wages to influence the distribution of y among their applicant pools.
The wage functions, w(y), defined on [y∗, 1], are assumed to be affine.
Under the previous assumptions, we find that, despite recruitment selection, job cre-
ation becomes (partially) efficient. Conversely, participation remains (partially) in-
sufficient. The reason for this is that firms are too small to exert any influence on
individuals’ participation decisions. We therefore surmise that the inefficiency of par-
ticipation is likely to hold in any wage-posting model. These results are established
as follows.
Consider one sub-market. In this sub-market, the wage function, w(y), and the
market tightness, θ, are set by maximizing22
22The rates q(y) and p(y) are defined as in the text when replacing v/n with θ.
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V ≡ −c+
∫ yˆ
y∗
q(y)(y − w(y))dy (27)
subject to the (indifference) constraint that for all y in [y∗, 1]
−γ + p(y)w(y) + (1− p(y))z = Φ¯(y) (28)
where the expected incomes of participants, Φ¯(y), are treated as exogenous.
As p(y) = q(y)(f(y)/θ), the indifference constraint implies
∫ yˆ
y∗
q(y)(w(y)− z)dy =
1
θ
∫ yˆ
y∗
(Φ¯(y) + γ − z)f(y)dy
Substitution into (27) gives
V (θ) ≡ −c+Q(θ)
∫ yˆ
y∗
ρ(y)ydy −
1
θ
∫ yˆ
y∗
(Φ¯(y) + γ − z)f(y)dy −Q(θ)z
Market tightness θ appears to be a free maximum of V (θ). The first order condition
for this maximum is
Q′(θ)(y¯ − z) +Q(θ)
∂(y¯ − z)
∂θ
+
1
θ2
∫ yˆ
y∗
(Φ¯(y) + γ − z)f(y)dy = 0
Let w¯ denote the average wage. In a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain23
w¯ = z + (η + α)(y¯ − z)
This shows that job creation is (partially) efficient in this setting. See Proposition 1b.
As wage functions are (assumed to be) affine, participation is determined by
γ = p(y∗)(η + α)(y∗ − z)
Since η + α > 0, this shows that participation remains (partially) insufficient. See
Proposition 1a.
23Remember that α is the elasticity of (y¯ − z) with respect to v, hence to θ, in absolute values.
46
TEPP Working Papers 2014 
 
14_1. Disparities in taking sick leave between sectors of activity in France: a longitudinal 
analysis of administrative data 
Thomas Barnay, Sandrine Juin, Renaud Legal 
 
 
TEPP Working Papers 2013 
 
13_9. An evaluation of the impact of industrial restructuring on individual human 
capital accumulation in France (1956-1993) 
Nicolas Fleury, Fabrice Gilles 
 
13_8. On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier 
relationship 
José de Sousa, Xavier Fairise 
 
13-7. Search frictions, real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment 
insurance 
Julien Albertini, Xavier Fairise 
 
13-6. Tax me if you can! Optimal non linear income tax between competing governments 
Etienne Lehmann, Laurent Simula, Alain Trannoy 
 
13-5. Beyond the labour income tax wedge: The unemployment-reducing effect of tax 
progressivity 
Etienne Lehmann, Claudio Lucifora, Simone Moriconi, Bruno Van Der Linden 
 
13-4. Discrimination based on place of residence and access to employment 
Mathieu Bunel, Emilia Ene Jones, Yannick L’Horty, Pascale Petit 
 
12-3. The determinants of job access channels: evidence from the youth labor market in 
Franc 
Jihan Ghrairi 
 
13-2. Capital mobility, search unemployment and labor market policies: The case of 
minimum wages 
Frédéric Gavrel 
 
13-1. Effort and monetary incentives in Nonprofit et For-Profit Organizations 
Joseph Lanfranchi, Mathieu Narcy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The TEPP Institute  
 
The CNRS Institute for Labor Studies and Public Policies (the TEPP Institute, 
FR n°3435 CNRS) gathers together research centres specializing in economics and sociology: 
 
• l'Equipe de Recherche sur les Marchés, l'Emploi et la Simulation (Research Team 
on Markets, Employment and Simulation), ERMES, University of Paris II Panthéon-
Assas 
 
• the Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques de l'université d'Evry (Research 
Centre focused on the analysis of economic policy and its foundations and 
implications), EPEE, University of Evry Val d’Essonne 
 
• the Centre Pierre Naville (Research on Work and Urban Policies), CPN, University 
of Evry Val d’Essonne 
 
• l'Equipe de Recherche sur l'Utilisation des Données Temporelles en Economie 
(Research Team on Use of Time Data in Economics), ERUDITE, University of Paris-
Est Créteil and University of Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée 
 
• the Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux (The Group on 
Analysis of Wage Levels and Trajectories), GAINS, University of the Maine 
 
The TEPP Institute brings together 147 researchers and research professors and 100 PhD 
students who study changes in work and employment in relation to the choices made by firms 
and analyse public policies using new evaluation methods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
www.tepp.eu 
